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GG-GSW: Chosen-Ciphertext Secure Leveled FHE From Gadget Trapdoors

Year: 2026

type: technique collection: schemes status: auto

Links: ePrint 2026/316

Summary

Auto-extracted summary (unreviewed)

GG-GSW is a leveled FHE scheme that achieves IND-CCA1 security in the standard model without SNARKs by combining Micciancio-Peikert gadget trapdoors with the GSW scheme, changing GSW only minimally so that ciphertext size stays similar and homomorphic operations are unchanged. Security is proved under a new delayed-target LWE assumption, supported by a reduction from standard LWE under a lattice knowledge assumption and a quantum reduction from one-more inhomogeneous SIS for a restricted parameter regime. Using randomized evaluation, the scheme also gets IND-CPAD security for branching programs with only polynomial noise flooding and without statistical correctness.

Abstract

We present a simple leveled fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme that achieves IND-CCA1 security in the standard model without relying on SNARKs. Our construction combines the gadget trapdoors introduced by Micciancio and Peikert [Eurocrypt 2012] with the GSW leveled FHE scheme [Gentry, Sahai, Waters, Crypto 2013]. We make only minimal changes to GSW to obtain security: ciphertext size remains similar and the homomorphic operations are unchanged. We prove IND-CCA1 security under a new delayed-target LWE assumption. We provide evidence for its hardness in two ways: under a lattice knowledge assumption, we give a reduction from standard LWE; for a restricted parameter regime, we give a quantum reduction from the onemore inhomogeneous short integer solution assumption. Finally, using the randomized evaluation technique from Bourse et al. [Crypto 2016], we obtain IND-CPAD security for branching programs using only polynomial noise flooding and without requiring statistical correctness.
Source: pdf

Extracted details

Field Value Source Confidence
contribution IND-CCA1-secure leveled FHE in the standard model without SNARKs llm 0.80
contribution combination of gadget trapdoors with GSW with minimal changes llm 0.80
contribution new delayed-target LWE assumption with hardness evidence (lattice knowledge reduction, quantum reduction from one-more ISIS) llm 0.80
contribution IND-CPAD security for branching programs with polynomial noise flooding llm 0.80
schemes GSW llm 0.80
schemes gadget trapdoors (Micciancio-Peikert) llm 0.80
schemes LWE llm 0.80
tasks chosen-ciphertext secure homomorphic evaluation llm 0.80
tasks branching program evaluation llm 0.80
threat model active adversary with non-adaptive decryption queries (IND-CCA1); IND-CPAD llm 0.80
interaction non-interactive FHE llm 0.80
limitations security relies on a new, non-standard delayed-target LWE assumption llm 0.80
limitations quantum reduction from one-more ISIS holds only for a restricted parameter regime llm 0.80
llm relevance low llm 0.80

Keyword mentions

Counts of vocabulary terms in the full text (first page of occurrence in brackets).

  • scheme: GSW 92 [p.1], Leveled / somewhat HE 31 [p.1], ElGamal 6 [p.7]
  • technique: Noise flooding 8 [p.1], Bootstrapping 3 [p.28]
  • assumption: LWE 173 [p.1], Lattice-based 41 [p.1], IND-CPA-D 21 [p.1], IND-CPA 8 [p.1], RLWE 2 [p.6], DDH 2 [p.4]
  • topic: Homomorphic encryption 86 [p.1]

Files

Path (under papers/) Collection Pages Size SHA-256 Note
references/schemes/s20-2_eprint-2026-316.pdf schemes 47 874.6 KB eaa6d9eaed40
references/schemes/s34-1_eprint-2026-316.pdf schemes 47 874.6 KB eaa6d9eaed40 byte-identical to references/schemes/s20-2_eprint-2026-316.pdf

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