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Fully Homomorphic Encryption with Chosen-Ciphertext Security from LWE

Authors: Yang, Yu, Susilo
Year: 2025
Venue: CRYPTO 2025

type: scheme collection: schemes status: auto

Links: ePrint 2026/1756

Visual lesson: CCA-secure FHE · Scheme table row: CCA-secure FHE

Summary

Auto-extracted summary (unreviewed)

The paper constructs 1-hop fully homomorphic encryption with chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model from circular-secure LWE, the same assumption needed for CPA-secure FHE, and achieves a notion strictly stronger than CCA1 (IV-CCA). It follows the Naor-Yung double-encryption paradigm but replaces general ZK-SNARKs with a special succinct argument for FHE ciphertext validity built from batch arguments for NP and a new primitive, predicate extractable commitments. Previous CCA1-secure FHE required random oracles or non-falsifiable assumptions.

Abstract

We construct (1-hop) fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes with chosen-ciphertext (CCA) security from the learning with errors (LWE) assumption in the standard model. Security of our construction only relies on the circular-secure LWE, which matches the assumptions needed for FHE with the basic chosen-plaintext security. Besides, the scheme achieves a security notion that is strictly stronger than the CCA1 security. Prior FHE schemes with even just CCA1 security require either the random oracle model or non-falsifiable assumptions. The construction follows the well-known Naor-Yung double encryption paradigm. However, unlike previous works [Boneh et al., ITCS 2012; Canetti et al., PKC 2017; Manulis and Nguyen, Eurocrypt 2024], which employ general zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (ZK-SNARKs), we design a special succinct argument to prove the validity of FHE ciphertexts. The succinct argument is constructed from batch arguments for NP and a new primitive called predicate extractable commitment, which may be of independent interest.
Source: pdf

Extracted details

Field Value Source Confidence
contribution First (1-hop) FHE with CCA security from circular-secure LWE in the standard model llm 0.85
contribution Security notion strictly stronger than CCA1 with a verification algorithm for evaluated ciphertexts llm 0.85
contribution Special succinct argument for FHE ciphertext validity from batch arguments for NP instead of general ZK-SNARKs llm 0.85
contribution New primitive: predicate extractable commitment llm 0.85
contribution Proofs of evaluation correctness, compactness and IV-CCA security llm 0.85
schemes LWE-based FHE llm 0.85
schemes Naor-Yung double encryption llm 0.85
schemes batch arguments for NP llm 0.85
schemes NIZK llm 0.85
schemes predicate extractable commitment llm 0.85
tasks FHE secure against active (chosen-ciphertext) attacks llm 0.85
threat model active adversary with decryption-oracle access (chosen-ciphertext attacks), standard model llm 0.85
interaction non-interactive FHE llm 0.85
limitations Only 1-hop homomorphism (evaluated ciphertexts cannot be further evaluated) llm 0.85
limitations Relies on circular-secure LWE to obtain unbounded-depth (non-leveled) FHE llm 0.85
llm relevance low llm 0.85

Scheme card: CCA-secure FHE

Group 5. Earlier and other FHE constructions
Kind Scheme
Hardness assumption Circular-secure LWE
Plaintext type Bits
SIMD packing No
Bootstrapping Yes
Post-quantum Yes
Status Active (theory)
Fit for LLM inference Stronger security when the server may act as a decryption oracle, which CKKS cannot provide.
Follow-ups GG-GSW: IND-CCA1 leveled FHE (2026/316).
Follow-up papers in the archive GG-GSW: Chosen-Ciphertext Secure Leveled FHE From Gadget Trapdoors

Keyword mentions

Counts of vocabulary terms in the full text (first page of occurrence in brackets).

  • scheme: Zero-knowledge proofs 22 [p.1], Leveled / somewhat HE 7 [p.2], TFHE 2 [p.2], FHEW 2 [p.2], MPC 2 [p.36]
  • dataset: ARC 3 [p.33]
  • technique: Non-interactive 15 [p.1], Bootstrapping 12 [p.12]
  • assumption: LWE 52 [p.1], IND-CPA 10 [p.2], Lattice-based 5 [p.1]
  • topic: Homomorphic encryption 298 [p.1]

Files

Path (under papers/) Collection Pages Size SHA-256 Note
references/schemes/s34-0_fully-homomorphic-encryption-with-chosen-ciphertext-security.pdf schemes 67 635.8 KB 6296080e541c

Database key: fully-homomorphic-encryption-with-chosen-ciphertext-security-from-lwe · created 2026-11-05 · updated 2026-11-05 · edit with python3 tools/paperdb.py set fully-homomorphic-encryption-with-chosen-ciphertext-security-from-lwe COLUMN VALUE