Fully Homomorphic Encryption with Chosen-Ciphertext Security from LWE¶
Authors: Yang, Yu, Susilo
Year: 2025
Venue: CRYPTO 2025
type: scheme collection: schemes status: auto
Links: ePrint 2026/1756
Visual lesson: CCA-secure FHE · Scheme table row: CCA-secure FHE
Summary¶
Auto-extracted summary (unreviewed)
The paper constructs 1-hop fully homomorphic encryption with chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model from circular-secure LWE, the same assumption needed for CPA-secure FHE, and achieves a notion strictly stronger than CCA1 (IV-CCA). It follows the Naor-Yung double-encryption paradigm but replaces general ZK-SNARKs with a special succinct argument for FHE ciphertext validity built from batch arguments for NP and a new primitive, predicate extractable commitments. Previous CCA1-secure FHE required random oracles or non-falsifiable assumptions.
Abstract¶
We construct (1-hop) fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes with chosen-ciphertext (CCA) security from the learning with errors (LWE) assumption in the standard model. Security of our construction only relies on the circular-secure LWE, which matches the assumptions needed for FHE with the basic chosen-plaintext security. Besides, the scheme achieves a security notion that is strictly stronger than the CCA1 security. Prior FHE schemes with even just CCA1 security require either the random oracle model or non-falsifiable assumptions. The construction follows the well-known Naor-Yung double encryption paradigm. However, unlike previous works [Boneh et al., ITCS 2012; Canetti et al., PKC 2017; Manulis and Nguyen, Eurocrypt 2024], which employ general zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (ZK-SNARKs), we design a special succinct argument to prove the validity of FHE ciphertexts. The succinct argument is constructed from batch arguments for NP and a new primitive called predicate extractable commitment, which may be of independent interest.
Source: pdf
Extracted details¶
| Field | Value | Source | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| contribution | First (1-hop) FHE with CCA security from circular-secure LWE in the standard model | llm | 0.85 |
| contribution | Security notion strictly stronger than CCA1 with a verification algorithm for evaluated ciphertexts | llm | 0.85 |
| contribution | Special succinct argument for FHE ciphertext validity from batch arguments for NP instead of general ZK-SNARKs | llm | 0.85 |
| contribution | New primitive: predicate extractable commitment | llm | 0.85 |
| contribution | Proofs of evaluation correctness, compactness and IV-CCA security | llm | 0.85 |
| schemes | LWE-based FHE | llm | 0.85 |
| schemes | Naor-Yung double encryption | llm | 0.85 |
| schemes | batch arguments for NP | llm | 0.85 |
| schemes | NIZK | llm | 0.85 |
| schemes | predicate extractable commitment | llm | 0.85 |
| tasks | FHE secure against active (chosen-ciphertext) attacks | llm | 0.85 |
| threat model | active adversary with decryption-oracle access (chosen-ciphertext attacks), standard model | llm | 0.85 |
| interaction | non-interactive FHE | llm | 0.85 |
| limitations | Only 1-hop homomorphism (evaluated ciphertexts cannot be further evaluated) | llm | 0.85 |
| limitations | Relies on circular-secure LWE to obtain unbounded-depth (non-leveled) FHE | llm | 0.85 |
| llm relevance | low | llm | 0.85 |
Scheme card: CCA-secure FHE¶
| Group | 5. Earlier and other FHE constructions |
| Kind | Scheme |
| Hardness assumption | Circular-secure LWE |
| Plaintext type | Bits |
| SIMD packing | No |
| Bootstrapping | Yes |
| Post-quantum | Yes |
| Status | Active (theory) |
| Fit for LLM inference | Stronger security when the server may act as a decryption oracle, which CKKS cannot provide. |
| Follow-ups | GG-GSW: IND-CCA1 leveled FHE (2026/316). |
| Follow-up papers in the archive | GG-GSW: Chosen-Ciphertext Secure Leveled FHE From Gadget Trapdoors |
Keyword mentions¶
Counts of vocabulary terms in the full text (first page of occurrence in brackets).
- scheme: Zero-knowledge proofs 22 [p.1], Leveled / somewhat HE 7 [p.2], TFHE 2 [p.2], FHEW 2 [p.2], MPC 2 [p.36]
- dataset: ARC 3 [p.33]
- technique: Non-interactive 15 [p.1], Bootstrapping 12 [p.12]
- assumption: LWE 52 [p.1], IND-CPA 10 [p.2], Lattice-based 5 [p.1]
- topic: Homomorphic encryption 298 [p.1]
Related papers¶
- GG-GSW: Chosen-Ciphertext Secure Leveled FHE From Gadget Trapdoors follow up of this paper — follow-up listed for scheme "CCA-secure FHE"
Files¶
| Path (under papers/) | Collection | Pages | Size | SHA-256 | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
references/schemes/s34-0_fully-homomorphic-encryption-with-chosen-ciphertext-security.pdf |
schemes | 67 | 635.8 KB | 6296080e541c |
Database key: fully-homomorphic-encryption-with-chosen-ciphertext-security-from-lwe · created 2026-11-05 · updated 2026-11-05 · edit with python3 tools/paperdb.py set fully-homomorphic-encryption-with-chosen-ciphertext-security-from-lwe COLUMN VALUE