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Touch of Privacy: A Homomorphic Encryption-Powered Deep Learning Framework for Fingerprint Authentication

Authors: U. Sumalatha; K. Krishna Prakasha; Srikanth Prabhu; Vinod C. Nayak
Year: 2025
Venue: IEEE Access

type: application collection: ppml status: auto

Links: DOI

Summary

Auto-extracted summary (unreviewed)

Builds a privacy-preserving fingerprint authentication system in which a CNN extracts fingerprint features that are encrypted with CKKS via TenSEAL, and matching is performed by Euclidean similarity in the encrypted domain so the server never sees raw biometrics; decryption happens only on the client. On a 90-user, 7,200-image subset of SOCOFing the system reaches 99.06% test accuracy, EER 0.40% and FAR 0%, with an encrypted comparison in 0.025 s and 0.136 s total per fingerprint despite a 157.26x encryption overhead.

Abstract

Deep learning and fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) are integrated for privacy-preserving fingerprint recognition. Convolutional neural network (CNN) extract fingerprint features encrypted using the Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song (CKKS) FHE scheme. TenSEAL ensures all computations occur in the encrypted domain, preventing raw biometric data exposure during authentication. A subset of the SOCOFing dataset, comprising 7,200 altered fingerprints from 90 individuals across three difficulty levels, is used for training (80%), validation (10%), and testing (10%). One real fingerprint per user is encrypted and stored for authentication, reducing computational complexity. The CNN classifies encrypted features without decryption, ensuring secure authentication. The system, utilizing Euclidean similarity, achieves 99.06% test accuracy with a loss of 0.1692, a True Acceptance Rate (TAR) of 99.19%, a False Rejection Rate (FRR) of 0.81%, a False Acceptance Rate (FAR) of 0%, and a True Rejection Rate (TRR) of 100%, with a minimal Equal Error Rate (EER) of 0.40%. Encrypted templates require only 31 MB for 90 users, averaging 344 KB per fingerprint per user. Despite a 157.26× encryption overhead, remains feasible for real-time applications, completing an encrypted comparison in 0.025 seconds with a total processing time of 0.136 seconds per fingerprint. Adhering to ISO/IEC 24745 biometric protection standards, the system ensures irreversibility, unlinkability, and renewability of biometric templates. Decryption occurs only on the client side, keeping raw fingerprint data inaccessible to the server. The results confirm the feasibility of FHE for secure fingerprint authentication in cloud-based environments, benefiting applications in healthcare, banking, and access control.
Source: pdf

Extracted details

Field Value Source Confidence
contribution CNN feature extraction combined with CKKS-encrypted template matching for fingerprint authentication llm 0.75
contribution Threshold-based verification using Euclidean similarity on encrypted features llm 0.75
contribution One encrypted real fingerprint per user stored to reduce computational cost llm 0.75
contribution Compliance with ISO/IEC 24745 (irreversibility, unlinkability, renewability) llm 0.75
contribution Evaluation of accuracy, biometric error rates, storage and latency on SOCOFing llm 0.75
schemes CKKS llm 0.75
libraries TenSEAL llm 0.75
models CNN llm 0.75
datasets SOCOFing (subset: 7,200 altered fingerprints, 90 users) llm 0.75
tasks fingerprint authentication llm 0.75
tasks biometric recognition llm 0.75
tasks secure cloud-based biometric matching llm 0.75
threat model client-server; decryption only on client, server never accesses raw fingerprint data llm 0.75
interaction non-interactive FHE llm 0.75
limitations 157.26x encryption overhead relative to plaintext processing llm 0.75
limitations Evaluated on a 90-user subset of SOCOFing llm 0.75
llm relevance low llm 0.75
key result test accuracy: 99.06% (SOCOFing subset, Euclidean similarity) llm 0.75
key result TAR / FRR / FAR / TRR: 99.19% / 0.81% / 0% / 100% (SOCOFing subset) llm 0.75
key result EER: 0.40% (SOCOFing subset) llm 0.75
key result encrypted comparison latency: 0.025 s (0.136 s total per fingerprint) (CKKS via TenSEAL) llm 0.75
key result encryption overhead: 157.26x (vs plaintext) llm 0.75
key result template storage: 31 MB for 90 users (344 KB per fingerprint) (encrypted templates) llm 0.75

Keyword mentions

Counts of vocabulary terms in the full text (first page of occurrence in brackets).

  • scheme: CKKS 10 [p.1], Multi-key HE 3 [p.4], Leveled / somewhat HE 3 [p.2]
  • library: TenSEAL 18 [p.1], Microsoft SEAL 6 [p.2], Concrete (Zama) 3 [p.3], Concrete ML 2 [p.3], TensorFlow 1 [p.9], ONNX 1 [p.3]
  • model: CNN 30 [p.1], LeNet 1 [p.3], k-means 1 [p.4]
  • dataset: Fingerprint (FVC) 133 [p.1]
  • hardware: GPU 3 [p.8], NVIDIA A100 1 [p.8], NVIDIA Jetson 1 [p.4], Intel Xeon 1 [p.9], TPU 1 [p.16], CUDA 1 [p.9]
  • technique: Convolution 9 [p.1], Quantization 3 [p.3], Bootstrapping 2 [p.2], Softmax 2 [p.10], Rotations 2 [p.3], Fine-tuning 2 [p.10]
  • assumption: LWE 3 [p.14]
  • task: Medical / healthcare 9 [p.1], Finance 3 [p.1], Clustering 2 [p.4], IoT / edge 2 [p.4]
  • topic: Homomorphic encryption 59 [p.1], Privacy-preserving machine learning 5 [p.3], Private / secure inference 2 [p.3]

Files

Path (under papers/) Collection Pages Size SHA-256 Note
references/ppml/applications/sumalatha-2025_touch-of-privacy-he-powered-deep-learning-for-fingerprint-authentication.pdf ppml/applications 17 1.5 MB 2a3055d7e35c was Sumalatha et al. - 2025 - Touch of Privacy A Homomorphic Encryption-Powered Deep Learning Framework for Fingerprint Authentic.pdf

Database key: touch-of-privacy-a-homomorphic-encryption-powered-deep-learning · created 2026-11-05 · updated 2026-11-05 · edit with python3 tools/paperdb.py set touch-of-privacy-a-homomorphic-encryption-powered-deep-learning COLUMN VALUE