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Multi-key Fully Homomorphic Encryption with Non-Interactive Setup in the Plain Model

Year: 2026

type: technique collection: schemes status: auto

Links: ePrint 2026/322

Summary

Auto-extracted summary (unreviewed)

The paper gives the first multi-key FHE scheme in the plain model, i.e. without any common reference string or interactive setup, based on RLWE: a multi-key somewhat homomorphic scheme is extended to a multi-key variant of GSW under a circular-security assumption, which yields 2-round semi-honest MPC in the plain model and a generic conversion of RGSW-based FHE schemes (BGV, BFV, CKKS, FHEW, TFHE, Carousel) into multi-key variants. A proof-of-concept implementation on HIENAA.jl at 128-bit security reports single-to-multi-key RGSW extension and multi-key multiplication in 177 ms and 178 ms for 2 parties, rising to 10.9 s and 5.7 s for 8 parties, with ciphertexts of 10.6-191 MB.

Abstract

Multi-key fully homomorphic encryption (MKFHE) enables computation over encrypted data under multiple different keys. Constructing MKFHE without any trusted or interactive setup remains an open problem. In the context of MKFHE, a trusted setup is often assumed to mean the use of a common random string (CRS). In this paper, we present the first MKFHE scheme in the plain model (i.e., without any trusted or interactive setup) based on the RLWE assumption. Specifically, we construct a multi-key somewhat homomorphic encryption based on the RLWE assumption and extend it to a multi-key variant of the Gentry-Sahai-Waters (GSW) scheme with a circular security assumption. Our design yields a 2-round multi-party computation (MPC) in the plain model against semi-honest adversaries. Moreover, it can be applied to transform existing FHE schemes that rely on RGSW in their construction into a multi-key variant. We also provide concrete conversions for widelyused FHE schemes, including BGV, BFV, CKKS, FHEW, TFHE, and Carousel. Finally, we implement our scheme and present experimental results for the expansion algorithm from a single-key ciphertext to a multi-key ciphertext and the multi-key homomorphic multiplication algorithm.
Source: pdf

Extracted details

Field Value Source Confidence
contribution first MKFHE scheme in the plain model (no trusted or interactive setup) from RLWE llm 0.85
contribution multi-key somewhat homomorphic encryption extended to a multi-key GSW variant with circular security llm 0.85
contribution 2-round multi-party computation in the plain model against semi-honest adversaries llm 0.85
contribution generic transformation of RGSW-based FHE schemes into multi-key variants, with concrete conversions for BGV, BFV, CKKS, FHEW, TFHE and Carousel llm 0.85
contribution proof-of-concept implementation with timings for ciphertext expansion and multi-key multiplication llm 0.85
schemes multi-key FHE llm 0.85
schemes GSW/RGSW llm 0.85
schemes BGV llm 0.85
schemes BFV llm 0.85
schemes CKKS llm 0.85
schemes FHEW llm 0.85
schemes TFHE llm 0.85
schemes Carousel llm 0.85
libraries HIENAA.jl llm 0.85
libraries lattice-estimator llm 0.85
hardware Intel Xeon Platinum 8268 CPU @ 2.90GHz, 376 GB RAM llm 0.85
security level 128-bit llm 0.85
threat model semi-honest; multiple parties with independently generated keys and no trusted setup (plain model) llm 0.85
interaction non-interactive FHE llm 0.85
code url https://github.com/SNUCP/crsless.Our (URL found in the full text) regex 0.50
code url https://github.com/snu-lukemin/HIENAA.jl (URL found in the full text) regex 0.50
code url https://github.com/SNUCP/crsless llm 0.85
limitations recommended parameter sets only allow circuits of depth at most two llm 0.85
limitations ciphertext and public-key sizes grow quickly with the number of parties (1.53 GB public key for 8 parties) llm 0.85
limitations GSW-style extension relies on a circular security assumption llm 0.85
limitations proof-of-concept implementation llm 0.85
llm relevance low llm 0.85
key result RGSW extension time (single-key to multi-key): 177 ms / 962 ms / 10,897 ms (K = 2 / 4 / 8 parties) llm 0.85
key result internal (multi-key) product time: 178 ms / 756 ms / 5,718 ms (K = 2 / 4 / 8 parties) llm 0.85
key result vector gadget product time: 11 ms / 66 ms / 425 ms (K = 2 / 4 / 8 parties) llm 0.85
key result ciphertext size: 10.6 MB / 41.0 MB / 191.28 MB (K = 2 / 4 / 8 parties) llm 0.85
key result public key size: 21.3 MB / 164.0 MB / 1.53 GB (K = 2 / 4 / 8 parties) llm 0.85
key result supported multiplicative depth: at most 2 (recommended parameters, N = 2^12-2^13, log Q = 100-214, Hamming weight 192) llm 0.85

Keyword mentions

Counts of vocabulary terms in the full text (first page of occurrence in brackets).

  • scheme: Multi-key HE 26 [p.1], MPC 18 [p.1], TFHE 14 [p.1], GSW 12 [p.1], BFV 11 [p.1], CKKS 10 [p.1], NTRU 5 [p.2], Oblivious transfer 5 [p.2], BGV 3 [p.1], FHEW 3 [p.1], LTV 3 [p.2], Multiparty HE 3 [p.28], Leveled / somewhat HE 3 [p.1]
  • library: Zama 2 [p.37]
  • model: Decision tree 2 [p.35]
  • hardware: Intel Xeon 1 [p.32]
  • technique: Bootstrapping 18 [p.3], Key switching 16 [p.8], Rotations 10 [p.8], Relinearization 5 [p.8], Non-interactive 2 [p.1], Semi-honest model 2 [p.1]
  • assumption: RLWE 47 [p.1], LWE 34 [p.2], Module-LWE 34 [p.4], Lattice-based 9 [p.10]
  • topic: Homomorphic encryption 62 [p.1], Open source 2 [p.32]

Files

Path (under papers/) Collection Pages Size SHA-256 Note
references/schemes/s37-1_eprint-2026-322.pdf schemes 37 540.8 KB 6f55b58c67da

Database key: multi-key-fully-homomorphic-encryption-with-non-interactive-setup-in · created 2026-11-05 · updated 2026-11-05 · edit with python3 tools/paperdb.py set multi-key-fully-homomorphic-encryption-with-non-interactive-setup-in COLUMN VALUE