Cryptanalysis of Symmetric Primitives over Rings and a Key Recovery Attack on Rubato¶
Year: 2023
type: technique collection: schemes status: auto
Links: ePrint 2023/822
Summary¶
Auto-extracted summary (unreviewed)
The paper studies how algebraic attacks developed over fields carry over to symmetric primitives defined over the ring Z_q for composite q. Applying this analysis to Rubato, an FHE-friendly cipher designed for transciphering with approximate (CKKS) FHE, the authors give a full key-recovery attack and show that at least 25% of the admissible moduli q lead to complexity well below the claimed security level for five of the six Rubato instances.
Abstract¶
Symmetric primitives are a cornerstone of cryptography, and have traditionally been defined over fields, where cryptanalysis is now well understood. However, a few symmetric primitives defined over rings Zq for a composite number q have recently been proposed, a setting where security is much less studied. In this paper we focus on studying established algebraic attacks typically defined over fields and the extent of their applicability to symmetric primitives defined over the ring of integers modulo a composite q. Based on our analysis, we present an attack on full Rubato, a family of symmetric ciphers proposed by Ha et al. at Eurocrypt 2022 designed to be used in a transciphering framework for approximate fully homomorphic encryption. We show that at least 25% of the possible choices for q satisfy certain conditions that lead to a successful key recovery attack with complexity significantly lower than the claimed security level for five of the six ciphers in the Rubato family.
Source: pdf
Extracted details¶
| Field | Value | Source | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| contribution | analysis of the applicability of algebraic attacks (interpolation, higher-order differential, Groebner bases) to primitives over composite-modulus rings | llm | 0.85 |
| contribution | key-recovery attack on full Rubato | llm | 0.85 |
| contribution | characterization of the conditions on q that make the attack succeed (at least 25% of choices) | llm | 0.85 |
| schemes | Rubato | llm | 0.85 |
| schemes | CKKS | llm | 0.85 |
| libraries | Lattigo | llm | 0.85 |
| tasks | cryptanalysis of FHE-friendly symmetric ciphers | llm | 0.85 |
| tasks | transciphering for approximate FHE | llm | 0.85 |
| threat model | key-recovery attacker with access to Rubato keystream | llm | 0.85 |
| code url | https://github.com/Simula-UiB/RubatoAttack (URL found in the full text) | regex | 0.50 |
| code url | https://github.com/tuneinsight/lattigo (URL found in the full text) | regex | 0.50 |
| code url | https://github.com/Simula-UiB/RubatoAttack | llm | 0.85 |
| llm relevance | low | llm | 0.85 |
| key result | fraction of vulnerable moduli q: at least 25% (Rubato parameter choices) | llm | 0.85 |
| key result | affected ciphers: 5 of 6 Rubato instances (key recovery with complexity significantly below claimed security level) | llm | 0.85 |
Keyword mentions¶
Counts of vocabulary terms in the full text (first page of occurrence in brackets).
- scheme: MPC 17 [p.2], Hybrid HE / transciphering 11 [p.1], TFHE 6 [p.4], CKKS 5 [p.19], Zero-knowledge proofs 5 [p.2], BFV 2 [p.19]
- library: Concrete (Zama) 2 [p.3], Lattigo 1 [p.31], Zama 1 [p.35], ABY / ABY3 1 [p.35]
- technique: Lookup table 13 [p.2], Relinearization 6 [p.28], Bootstrapping 5 [p.19], Matrix multiplication 2 [p.39], Malicious model 2 [p.33]
- topic: Homomorphic encryption 33 [p.1], Open source 2 [p.28]
Related papers¶
- this paper follow up of Transciphering Framework for Approximate Homomorphic Encryption — follow-up listed for scheme "HERA / Rubato (CKKS transciphering)"
Files¶
| Path (under papers/) | Collection | Pages | Size | SHA-256 | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
references/schemes/s41-2_eprint-2023-822.pdf |
schemes | 43 | 1.3 MB | dff9a2f7bc15 |
Database key: cryptanalysis-of-symmetric-primitives-over-rings-and-a-key-recovery · created 2026-11-05 · updated 2026-11-05 · edit with python3 tools/paperdb.py set cryptanalysis-of-symmetric-primitives-over-rings-and-a-key-recovery COLUMN VALUE