TL;DR

A broad survey of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) and its applications to privacy-preserving machine learning and bioinformatics in medicine, covering FHE history, schemes, open-source libraries, and HE-friendly implementations of logistic regression, Naive Bayes, decision trees, neural networks, clustering, sequence comparisons, genetic testing, and GWAS [§1, §7].

Problem and motivation

Medical and genomic data are highly sensitive and subject to laws such as HIPAA and GDPR, which limit free sharing for analysis [§1, p. 70:2]. FHE enables arbitrary computation on encrypted data and offers a path to privacy-preserving outsourced ML over medical/genomic data [§1]. The survey targets clinicians, computer scientists, engineers, and graduate students seeking entry into the FHE-for-medicine field [§1, p. 70:2]. Threat models discussed include private outsourced computation, private prediction (no client/server collusion assumed), and private training [§4, p. 70:10].

Key contributions

FHE setup

ML setup

Datasets

Dataset Task Size (train/test) Modality Notes
Not reported Survey paper N/A Various: medical records, imaging, VCF/DNA, GWAS SNP data The survey describes application domains (personalized medicine, paternity testing, ancestry, GWAS, osteoarthritis classification example) without running its own experiments [§4–6]

Pipeline diagram

The survey’s reference privacy-preserving classification model (Fig. 3, p. 70:11) [§4]:

flowchart LR
    subgraph Client
        A[Patient data] --> B[Encrypt with pk]
        G[Decrypt with sk] --> H[Result]
    end
    subgraph ModelOwner [Model owner]
        C[Trained params] --> D[Encrypt with pk]
    end
    subgraph Cloud [Cloud server]
        E[HE classification]
    end
    B -. enc data .-> E
    D -. enc params .-> E
    E -. enc result .-> G

Pipeline steps (text)

  1. Patient encrypts her private medical data under public key pk [§4, p. 70:11].
  2. Researchers / model owner encrypt trained model parameters under the same pk and upload to cloud [§4, p. 70:11].
  3. Cloud server homomorphically evaluates the classifier on the encrypted inputs [§4, p. 70:11].
  4. Encrypted result is returned to the patient [§4, p. 70:11].
  5. Patient decrypts with her private key sk to view the classification [§4, p. 70:11].

Architecture diagram

The survey’s taxonomy of FHE for medicine and bioinformatics [§1.0.1, §2–6]:

flowchart LR
    R[FHE for Medicine] --> H[FHE history]
    R --> L[FHE libraries]
    R --> M[PP ML in medicine]
    R --> B[PP Bioinformatics]

    H --> H1[Gentry 2009]
    H --> H2[R/LWE: BGV, BFV]
    H --> H3[Approx-GCD: DGHV]
    H --> H4[NTRU: LTV, YASHE]
    H --> H5[Practical: GSW, FHEW, TFHE, CKKS]

    L --> L1[SEAL, HElib]
    L --> L2[TFHE, HEAAN]
    L --> L3[PALISADE, LOL]
    L --> L4[Cingulata, FV-NFLlib, Lattigo]

    M --> M1[Logistic regression]
    M --> M2[Naive Bayes]
    M --> M3[Decision trees]
    M --> M4[SVM]
    M --> M5[Neural networks]
    M --> M6[Clustering]

    M5 --> N1[CryptoNets]
    M5 --> N2[CryptoDL]
    M5 --> N3[Chabanne et al.]
    M5 --> N4[Chimera]
    M5 --> N5[FHE-DiNN]
    M5 --> N6[E2DM]
    M5 --> N7[GAZELLE]

    B --> B1[Sequence comparison]
    B --> B2[Genetic testing]
    B --> B3[GWAS]

    B1 --> S1[Hamming distance]
    B1 --> S2[Edit distance]
    B2 --> T1[Paternity / ancestry]
    B2 --> T2[Personalized medicine]
    B3 --> G1[Logistic regression]
    B3 --> G2[Chi-squared test]

Results

The survey does not present new experimental results. It catalogs and compares prior systems qualitatively [§4.4.2, Table 2; §3, Table 1].

Metric This paper Baseline Hardware
New results None (survey) N/A N/A
Library catalog 9 libraries (Table 1) N/A N/A
NN frameworks catalog 7 frameworks (Table 2) N/A N/A
Reported per-system metrics Not aggregated quantitatively N/A N/A

The survey notes specific qualitative findings, e.g. CryptoNets’ square activation can be unstable on networks deeper than 10 layers [§4.4.2, p. 70:19]; Jaschke and Armknecht’s HE k-means takes over 25 days on a 2D, 400-point dataset [§5, p. 70:21]; an early Gentry-Halevi FHE implementation takes up to 30 minutes per bootstrap [§2.1, p. 70:5].

Limitations and assumptions

Prior surveys: Acar et al. (general FHE) [1], Armknecht et al. (FHE guide) [11], Martins et al. (engineering view) [148], Aziz et al. (genomic) [15, 158], Aguilar-Melchor et al. (signal processing) [3, 136], Peikert (theory) [166] [§1, p. 70:2]. Systems catalogued include CryptoNets, CryptoDL, Chimera, FHE-DiNN, E2DM, GAZELLE, MiniONN, nGraph-HE, and iDASH competition winners (Kim et al., Blatt et al., Carpov et al., Bonte et al.) [§4.4.2, §6.3].

Code and artifacts

Not released (survey paper). The libraries it surveys are open-source and linked in §3 (SEAL, HElib, TFHE, HEAAN, PALISADE, LOL, Cingulata, FV-NFLlib, Lattigo) [§3, Table 1].

Extra diagrams (optional)

Threat model

The survey’s standard private-prediction setup with non-colluding client and server [§4, p. 70:10–70:11]:

flowchart LR
    C[Client] -- enc(data) --> S[Cloud server]
    M[Model owner] -- enc(params) --> S
    S -- enc(result) --> C

Open questions