TL;DR

The authors train a tiny, 4-bit quantized fully connected neural network in plaintext using Quantization-Aware Training, then compile it with Zama Concrete ML into a TFHE circuit so encrypted MedMNIST images can be classified on a server that never sees the plaintext, losing essentially no accuracy versus the unencrypted baseline [Abstract, §6.3].

Problem and motivation

Hospitals and AI services need to analyse sensitive medical images while complying with HIPAA/GDPR, but raw image sharing risks breach, unauthorized access, and model inversion attacks [§1]. Prior PPML approaches each fail in some way: FL leaks via gradients, DP hurts accuracy, SMPC has high communication overhead, and existing FHE work is too slow for deep CNNs [§1]. The authors target a semi-honest server: the client is trusted and holds the secret key; the server is honest-but-curious and may see encrypted inputs, intermediate ciphertexts, and encrypted outputs but not the secret key [§7]. The framework is designed to mitigate data-privacy leakage, model-privacy leakage, and inference attacks [§7].

Key contributions

FHE setup

ML setup

Datasets

Dataset Task Size (train/test) Modality Notes
PneumoniaMNIST Binary classification (2 classes) 5,856 total samples Chest X-ray 28x28 MedMNIST 2D subset [Table 6]
BreastMNIST Binary classification (2 classes) 780 total samples Breast ultrasound 28x28 MedMNIST 2D subset [Table 6]
BloodMNIST Multi-class (8 classes) 17,092 total samples Blood cell microscopy 28x28 MedMNIST 2D subset [Table 6]

Pipeline diagram

flowchart LR
    subgraph Client
        A[Medical image] --> B[Quantize 4-bit]
        B --> C[Encrypt LWE]
        K[Generate keys]
    end
    subgraph Server
        D[Compiled FHE circuit]
        E[Homomorphic linear sum]
        F[PBS activation]
        G[Encrypted logits]
    end
    subgraph ClientDec [Client]
        H[Decrypt] --> I[Argmax label]
    end
    K -. eval key .-> D
    C -. ciphertext .-> D
    D --> E
    E --> F
    F --> G
    G -. ciphertext .-> H

Pipeline steps (text)

  1. Client preprocesses and quantizes the medical image to 4-bit integer tensors [§4.1].
  2. Client generates the private encryption key and the public evaluation key [§5.3].
  3. Client encrypts the quantized image using TFHE’s LWE scheme and stores it in a DataFrame for transport [§5.1].
  4. Client sends the encrypted image plus the public evaluation key to the server [§5.2].
  5. Server runs the pre-compiled FHE circuit: homomorphic weighted-sum per neuron (LWE x constant, LWE + LWE) [§4.1].
  6. Server invokes programmable bootstrapping per activation to evaluate ReLU and reset noise [§4.1, Eq. 17].
  7. Server returns the encrypted output prediction y_hat to the client [§5.4].
  8. Client decrypts y_hat with the secret key and takes the argmax to obtain the predicted class [§5.4].

Architecture diagram

flowchart LR
    I([Input 28x28=784, 4-bit]) --> FL[Flatten]
    FL --> FC1[FC 392, 4-bit weights]
    FC1 --> A1[ReLU via PBS]
    A1 --> FC2[FC num_classes]
    FC2 --> O([Argmax label])

Notes: width 392 = 0.5 x 784 from module__n_hidden_neurons_multiplier = 0.5 [Table 3]. Output width is 2 for Pneumonia/Breast MNIST and 8 for BloodMNIST [Table 6]. Accumulator pruning is applied so that the 16-bit accumulator constraint 0 <= v < 2^16 is never violated [§4.1, Eq. 14].

Results

Plaintext vs encrypted accuracy is essentially identical; encryption costs five orders of magnitude in latency.

Metric This paper Baseline Hardware
Accuracy Pneumonia (plaintext, Adam) 88.89% [Table 7] CryptoNets 66.57% / MiniONN 84.81% / BFVML 83.34% / Ran et al. 85.89% [Table 12] 9th gen Intel Core i5, 16 GB RAM [§6.2]
Accuracy Pneumonia (encrypted, Adam) 88.88% [Table 8] CryptoNets 65.38% / MiniONN 83.95% / BFVML 82.68% / Ran et al. 85.46% [Table 12] same
Accuracy Breast (encrypted) 81.81% (plaintext 81.82%) [Tables 7, 8] Not reported same
Accuracy Blood (encrypted) 84.61% (plaintext 84.74%) [Tables 7, 8] BFV MedBlindTuner 91.32% [Table 13] same
Latency Pneumonia (encrypted) 119.55 s / image [Table 11] 0.31 ms / image plaintext [Table 10] 9th gen Intel Core i5, 16 GB RAM
Latency Breast (encrypted) 137.68 s / image [Table 11] 0.62 ms / image plaintext [Table 10] same
Latency Blood (encrypted) 966.68 s / image [Table 11] 4.12 ms / image plaintext [Table 10] same
Training time Pneumonia 39 s (Adam) / 37.89 s (SGD) [Table 9] n/a same

Note: the paper’s abstract claims “an average inference time of 150 milliseconds per image” [Abstract], but the detailed experimental tables (Tables 10-11) report 119.55 s, 137.68 s, and 966.68 s per encrypted image. The 150 ms figure is inconsistent with the paper’s own results and looks like an error - the comparison block uses the Pneumonia table value (119.55 s).

Limitations and assumptions

CryptoNets [Gilad-Bachrach 2016, §6.4 / Table 12], MiniONN [Liu 2017, Table 12], BFVML [Wibawa 2022, Table 12], Ran et al. [2025, Table 12], MedBlindTuner / BlindTuner (BFV transformer on MedMNIST) [Panzade 2024-2025, Table 13], HETAL CKKS DermaMNIST [Lee 2023, Table 13], CryptoDL [Hesamifard 2016], Glyph [Lou 2020], TT-TFHE [Benamira 2023], Concrete ML / Stoian et al. [2023], Chillotti et al. PBS for DNN inference [2021].

Code and artifacts

Not released. The implementation builds on the open-source Zama Concrete ML library (https://github.com/zama-ai/concrete-ml) [§4, ref. 51] but the authors do not provide their own repository.

Extra diagrams (optional)

Threat model

flowchart LR
    C[Client trusted] -- E[x] medical image --> S[Server honest-but-curious]
    C -- eval key --> S
    S -- E[y_hat] encrypted label --> C
    C -. holds sk .- C

Semi-honest server: sees E[x], intermediate ciphertexts, and E[y_hat] but not the secret key s; IND-CPA security of TFHE under LWE prevents recovery of the plaintext image or label [§7].

Open questions