TL;DR

A practical study that benchmarks XGBoost, a neural network classifier, and logistic regression under FHE using TenSEAL and Concrete ML on the Kaggle breast cancer dataset, showing FHE preserves privacy but causes severe latency blow-ups (up to ~2,260 s test time) and accuracy losses (up to -32.45% for NN) due to quantization [§IV].

Problem and motivation

ML pipelines often run on cloud or HPC servers, but the underlying data (e.g. medical, financial) is private. FHE allows training/inference directly on ciphertexts so the server never sees plaintext, yet adoption is hindered by performance and operator-support limits [§I]. The paper investigates the practical cost of FHE: which operators are supported, how to approximate sigmoid, what slowdown and accuracy loss to expect, and which libraries are usable today [§I, §III]. Threat model is the standard client/server honest-but-curious cloud setting where the server holds the encrypted data and model and only the client owns the secret key [§I, Fig. 2].

Key contributions

FHE setup

ML setup

Datasets

Dataset Task Size (train/test) Modality Notes
Kaggle Breast Cancer [28] Binary classification (benign/malignant) 357 benign + 212 malignant samples (total 569; split not reported) Tabular 32 features reduced to 10 via Random Forest feature importance (100 trees); features standardized to mean 0, var 1 [§III-B]

Pipeline diagram

flowchart LR
    subgraph Client
        A[Load tabular data] --> B[Standardize features]
        B --> C[Encrypt with pk]
    end
    subgraph Server
        D[Compile FHE circuit] --> E[Encrypted inference]
        F[Encrypted LR training] --> E
    end
    subgraph Client_dec [Client]
        G[Decrypt with sk] --> H[Predict label]
    end
    C -. ciphertext .-> E
    C -. ciphertext .-> F
    E -. ciphertext .-> G

Pipeline steps (text)

  1. Client loads the breast cancer CSV and runs Random Forest feature selection to keep the top 10 features [§III-B].
  2. Client standardizes selected features (mean 0, variance 1) [§III-B].
  3. Client encrypts feature vectors with the public key under TenSEAL/Concrete ML [§I].
  4. For XGBoost and NN: plaintext model is compiled by Concrete ML into an FHE circuit (graph build, bit-width calc, key generation) [§IV].
  5. For Logistic Regression: training runs directly on ciphertexts using the degree-3 polynomial sigmoid approximation [§I-A, §IV].
  6. Server executes the encrypted operation graph on ciphertext inputs [§IV].
  7. Encrypted predictions return to client, who decrypts with the secret key [§I, Fig. 2].

Architecture diagram

The paper is a practical evaluation across three model families rather than a single NN design. The diagram below depicts the paper’s taxonomy of practical considerations.

flowchart LR
    P([FHE Practical Considerations]) --> O[Operator Set]
    P --> S[Schemes]
    P --> L[Libraries]
    P --> A[Approximations]
    P --> Q[Quantization]
    P --> M[Models Evaluated]
    O --> O1[add / sub / mul]
    O --> O2[poly eval / dot]
    O --> O3[no compare]
    S --> S1[BFV / BGV]
    S --> S2[CKKS]
    S --> S3[HEAAN]
    L --> L1[Microsoft SEAL]
    L --> L2[TenSEAL]
    L --> L3[Concrete ML]
    A --> A1[poly sigmoid deg-3]
    Q --> Q1[16-bit max]
    M --> M1[XGBoost]
    M --> M2[NN Classifier]
    M --> M3[Logistic Regression]

Results

Metric This paper Baseline Hardware
XGBoost train time (plain) 12.66 s scikit-learn baseline Colab, TPU V2-8, 11.24/334.56 GB RAM [§III-E]
XGBoost compile to FHE 0.66 s (Concrete ML) - same
XGBoost test time (encrypted) 94.57 s 0.01 s plaintext same
XGBoost accuracy 91.23% encrypted = 91.23% Concrete ML 92.98% scikit-learn same
XGBoost encrypted test (alt run) 2,259.50 s - same [§IV text]
NN Classifier train time 63.17 s 63.17 s scikit-learn same
NN test time (encrypted) 253.88 s (Table III) / 1983.6 s (text) 0.01 s plaintext same
NN accuracy (encrypted) 95.61% (Table III) / 60.53% (text) 96.49% scikit-learn same
Logistic Regression train (encrypted) 113.04 s 0.01 s plaintext same
Logistic Regression test (encrypted) 0.80 s 0.01 s plaintext same
Logistic Regression accuracy 87.72% encrypted 92.98% plaintext (-5.36%) same [Table IV]

Note: Table III and the paragraph text disagree on NN test time and accuracy (Table III: 253.88 s, 95.61%; text: 1983.6 s, 60.53%). Both numbers are recorded above verbatim from the paper [§IV].

Limitations and assumptions

Microsoft SEAL [7]; BFV [8]; BGV [9]; CKKS [10]; TenSEAL [11]; Concrete ML (Zama) [12]; HEAAN [23-27]; order-preserving encryption [13-15]; differential privacy [16-19]; random masking [20-22]; Chen et al. logistic regression over encrypted data [6].

Code and artifacts

Not released. Experiments were conducted in Google Colab notebooks; no public repo URL is mentioned [§III, §V].

Extra diagrams (optional)

Threat model

flowchart LR
    C[Client / Data Owner] -- enc(x) using pk --> S[Server / Cloud]
    S -- encrypted inference / training --> S
    S -- enc(y) --> C
    C -- decrypt with sk --> C

Honest-but-curious server; only the client holds the secret key; server never needs the public key for inference per [§I].

Activation approximation

Sigmoid is replaced by a degree-3 polynomial used in [6]: h(x) ~= 0.5 + 0.197 * theta^T x - 0.004 * (theta^T x)^3 [§I-A]. See paper for the full derivation of the logistic regression gradient under this approximation.

Open questions